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Schadenfreude is the pleasure derived from another person’s misfortune, and several 
antecedents for schadenfreude has been identified, such as envy, self-enhancement, and 
deservingness. However, little is known about the effect of feeling schadenfreude on 
subsequent decisions. The present thesis investigates in four studies the effect of 
schadenfreude on decisions, which aimed at extending the previous research of Kramer, 
Yucel-Aybat, and Lau-Gesk (2011). It was expected that participants feeling schadenfreude 
would choose more conventional options compared to controls because the feeling of 
schadenfreude informs people of the possibility that a misfortune can befall them. 
Schadenfreude was induced either through a video clip chosen based on the results from the 
pre-test (Study 1 and 2) or through an affective priming task (Study 3 and 4). The decision 
tasks were the ultimatum game (Study 1 and 2), an economic version of the Asian disease 
problem (Study 3), and a consumer choice task involving compromise and extreme options 
(Study 4). Study 1 through 3 showed no effect of schadenfreude on decisions. However, 
Study 4 showed that schadenfreude increased the choice of unconventional (i.e., extreme) 
options (p = .037), which is the opposite of the predicted effect. These results are discussed in 
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 Schadenfreude is the pleasure at another’s misfortune. This emotion has gotten 
considerable attention from researchers over the past two decades. However, these 
researchers have mainly been interested in understanding how other’s misfortunes can evoke 
feelings of schadenfreude. Considering that schadenfreude is an emotion that one feels 
because of another person’s actions, an investigation of how schadenfreude affects behaviour 
would be interesting. The present thesis investigates how schadenfreude affects decisions, 
and it was predicted that schadenfreude would make participants choose conventional 
options, instead of unconventional options due to fear of unfavourable outcomes.  
 Study 1 and 2 investigated the effect of schadenfreude on the ultimatum game. 
Participants were students at the University of Oslo (Study 1) and workers on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Study 2), and they saw either a neutral video or a video that elicited 
schadenfreude. Afterwards, a one-shot ultimatum game was played where all participants 
were given the role of the proposer and allocated money.  
 Study 3 investigated the effect of schadenfreude on the choice of safe or risky 
gambles that were either framed as gains or losses. Participants were undergraduate 
psychology students at the University of Oslo, and were induced to feel schadenfreude or 
calm through an affective priming task. Afterwards, participants were asked to choose 
between a risky or safe option, which was framed in terms of either gains or losses. 
 Lastly, Study 4 investigated the effect of schadenfreude on the choice of compromise 
or extreme consumer options. Participants were Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, and they 
were induced to feel happy or schadenfreude through an affective priming task. Afterwards, 
participants were presented with two extreme options, which involved a trade-off between 
two attributes, and a compromise option, and were asked to choose one of these. 
 The results from Study 1 through 3 were non-significant. However, Study 4 found 
that participants in the schadenfreude condition chose more extreme options than participants 
in the happy condition, which is the opposite of our prediction as extreme options are 
unconventional.  
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Schadenfreude and Decisions 
 
Apple, a highly successful electronics company, and with such brand loyalty that Apple 
consumers are often compared to a cult (Riley & Boome, 2011), released a new mobile phone 
in September 2014. As expected, people flooded to Apple stores all over the world to get 
their hands on the iPhone 6 or iPhone 6 Plus (Nicks, 2014). However, just few days after the 
release, iPhone 6 Plus owners were complaining that the phone bends when carried in 
pockets (Lee & O’Callaghan, 2014). This lead to competing companies making fun of Apple 
on Twitter for what has been dubbed the “bend gate scandal”. For example, Samsung (2014) 
advertised their new phone by writing, “Curved. Not bent”. Following suit, LG (2014) wrote, 
“Our phone doesn’t bend, it flexes... on purpose”. Lastly, HTC (2014), not sparing on the 
insults, wrote, “Designed to withstand the most demanding environments. Like your 
pockets”.  
 The Twitter messages clearly show that Samsung and other companies were quite 
delighted by Apple’s mishap. They felt schadenfreude, which is the pleasure at the 
misfortune of others (Oxford Dictionaries). Schadenfreude receives considerable press-
coverage, and research on the antecedent triggers of schadenfreude has been substantial. 
However, little research has focused on the consequences of schadenfreude: Will 
experiencing schadenfreude towards Apple affect future decisions in Samsung, LG, and 
HTC?  
 A previous study by Kramer, Yucel-Aybat, & Lau-Gesk (2011) investigated how 
schadenfreude affects the choice of conventional versus unconventional options. They found 
that participants who were induced to feel schadenfreude chose lower-risk conventional 
options. This was argued to be because schadenfreude leads to the anticipation of 
unfavourable outcomes, which makes participants choose options that are less likely followed 
by negative outcomes.  
 Therefore, the present thesis will further look at how schadenfreude affects behaviour 
in three different types of decision-tasks: The allocation of money in ultimatum games, the 
choice of risky versus safe options, and the choice of compromise versus extreme consumer 
options. Based on Kramer et al.’s (2011) results, the hypothesis is that the experience of 
schadenfreude will increase the choice of conventional options in these decision tasks. 
Conventional options are regarded as the safe option in gambles, the compromise option in 
consumer choices, and fair (i.e., 50% of the total) allocations in the ultimatum game.  
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 In order to understand how schadenfreude can affect decisions, a review of the 
schadenfreude literature, and a discussion on how schadenfreude can be used as information 
in decisions will be presented. Lastly, predictions of the effect of schadenfreude on decision 
tasks will be presented by discussing what constitutes a conventional choice. 
 
Schadenfreude  
 Another person’s misfortune can evoke feelings of anger or sympathy, but the same 
event can also evoke schadenfreude (Feather, 2006). How can this same event evoke two 
very different emotions? According to appraisal theory, emotional responses are evoked 
through the individual’s appraisal of an event (Roseman & Smith, 2001). Therefore, for 
someone’s misfortune to evoke schadenfreude, this should be appraised as being beneficial 
for the schadenfroh person (Frijda, 1988). Three concerns on how another person’s 
misfortune can be beneficial have received empirical support: deservingness of the 
unfortunate outcome, the opportunity to self-enhance from other people’s unfortunate events, 
and prior envy felt towards the unfortunate other. 
 Deservingness. Another person’s misfortune can be seen as beneficial if this 
misfortune is seen as deserved, which then indicates a form of justice being served 
(Portmann, 2000). To judge an outcome as deserved or undeserved is related to the actions 
that lead to the outcome. A negative outcome is deserved if it was due to a negative prior 
action (Feather, 1999). For example, a person who does not put much effort into writing an 
application and comes unprepared for a job interview, is seen as deserving of the negative 
outcome, which is to not get the job (Feather, McKee, & Bekker, 2011). In addition, personal 
responsibility of the outcome increases judgements of deservingness, which then leads to 
feelings of schadenfreude (Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, & Nieweg, 2005).  
 The perceived deservingness of an outcome can also be influenced by the likeableness 
and moral character of the unfortunate person. Participants experienced more schadenfreude 
and rated the misfortune as more deserved when an unlikeable stimulus person suffered a 
misfortune, compared to when a likeable stimulus person experienced a misfortune (Hareli & 
Weiner, 2002). The moral character of a person affects the likableness of this person (Feather 
& Deverson, 2000). A study looked at the deservingness of punishment for an offence (child 
abuse or arson) committed by a person who was perceived as either having a strong or weak 
moral character (Feather & Atchison, 1998). The offenders who were judged to be more 
decent, reliable, worthy, and respectable (which together constitutes moral character) were 
judged to deserve the punishment less, and were less responsible for the offense. Moral 
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people are seen as less likely to bring about a negative event that leads to a negative outcome 
(Feather, 2014). However, people with weak moral characters such as hypocrites are more 
likely to act in a negative way (Powell & Smith, 2013).   
An outcome that is seen as undeserved can also lead to feelings of schadenfreude. A 
person’s undeserved positive outcome can lead to feelings of resentment, which then leads to 
feelings of schadenfreude when that person suffers a failure. Participants were asked to take 
the role of a low, average, or high performing student. They were then asked to judge a 
misfortune that befell a high achieving student who did not put much effort into his course 
work (Feather, 2008). Low performing participants felt the most resentment and 
schadenfreude towards the high achieving student. These results corroborate with the “tall 
poppy syndrome” seen in Australia (Feather, 1994) and Janteloven seen in Scandinavian 
countries (Bonde, 2009), which is the assertion that people who hold high-status positions 
should not think highly of themselves, and that people often wish to cut these high-status 
people down to size.   
Self-enhancement. Another way other’s misfortunes can be beneficial for the 
schadenfroh person is by providing self-enhancement opportunities though downward social 
comparisons (Willis, 1981). Self-enhancement motivations increase when one’s self-
evaluation is threatened, or for people with lower self-esteem (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993). 
Therefore, studies have looked at the relation between levels of self-esteem and self-
evaluation thereat on levels of schadenfreude. One study looked at the effect participants’ 
self-esteem has on experiences of schadenfreude (Van Dijk, Van Koningsbruggen, 
Ouwerkerk, & Wesseling, 2011). Low self-esteem participants experienced more 
schadenfreude when they read a story about a high achieving student who experienced a 
setback in his studies, compared to high self-esteem participants. Another study examined the 
combined effect of self-esteem and self-evaluation threat on experienced schadenfreude (Van 
Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Van Koningsbruggen, & Wesseling, 2012). Self-evaluation threat was 
manipulated by giving participants negative or positive feedback on a task. Participants then 
saw a video of a failed audition for a Dutch talent show, and responded to how much 
schadenfreude they felt. Participants with low self-esteem felt more schadenfreude after they 
had received negative feedback, compared to low self-esteem participants who received 
positive feedback. However, schadenfreude scores did not differ between high self-esteem 
participants who received negative or positive feedback (Van Dijk et al., 2012). 
 Schadenfreude due to self-evaluation threat can also occur on the group-level. 
University of Amsterdam students were made to feel inferior because their in-group had done 
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badly at an interuniversity quiz competition (Leach & Spears, 2008). Their out-group, the VU 
University Amsterdam, was successful in the quiz competition. However, in the finals, the 
VU University Amsterdam lost. Students reported feeling schadenfreude due to their out-
groups failure, where schadenfreude provides self-enhancement for members of inferior 
groups (Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Wesseling, & Van Koningsbruggen, 2011).  
 Envy. Lastly, another person’s misfortune is beneficial to the envious schadenfroh 
person because the misfortunate other is no longer in a higher position (Smith, Thielke, & 
Powell, 2014). However, research on envy being an antecedent to schadenfreude has 
produced inconsistent results, where some studies has found a relationship between envy and 
schadenfreude (Smith et al., 1996; Takahashi et al., 2009; Van Dijk et al., 2005), and other 
studies has not (Feather & Sherman, 2002; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Leach & Spears, 2008). 
The discrepancy in these studies is argued to be due to definitional challenges in regards to 
envy (Smith et al., 2014). Previous studies have not distinguished between two forms of 
envy, namely malicious and begin envy. A definition of these two forms of envy is given by 
Parrott & Smith (1993) where “envy arises when a person lacks another’s superior quality, 
achievement, or possession and either desires it or wishes that the other lacks it” (p. 908). 
Therefore, malicious envy makes people want to pull down superior others, while begin envy 
makes people want to pull themselves up to the same level as the superior others (Van de 
Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). It is argued that studies failing to find a link between envy 
and schadenfreude has investigated begin, and not malicious, envy (Powell, Smith, & 
Schurtz, 2008).  
 Combining schadenfreude research into one model. The three research areas of 
schadenfreude have been studied separately over the past years. However, efforts are made to 
merge these areas into one model of schadenfreude. A vignette study was conducted that 
incorporated all of the aforementioned variables into one structural model (Feather, Wenzel, 
and McKee, 2013). This model shows that deservingness is an important antecedent trigger 
of schadenfreude. The effect of deservingness of the outcome to feelings of schadenfreude is 
shown to be mediated through inferiority, resentment, and begin envy. Therefore, successful 
people who do not deserve their success are resented, which then leads to people thinking 
that their misfortunes are deserved when they suffer a misfortune, leading to higher feelings 
of schadenfreude. In addition, participants who reported higher levels of inferiority felt more 
resentment. However, begin envy was felt towards people who deserved their success and 
their failures were not seen as deserved, which lead to feelings of sympathy towards their 
failures. Other paths showed that people with low self-esteem felt more inferior which lead to 
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higher feelings of resentment and malicious envy, which ultimately lead to feelings of 
schadenfreude.  
 Therefore, these results integrate the previously separate research areas of 
schadenfreude into one model. This model shows that schadenfreude is a complex emotion 
where many appraisals are needed for one to feel schadenfreude. However, it seems that the 
deservingness of the unfortunate outcome is an important antecedent trigger of 
schadenfreude.  
 The research on schadenfreude has mainly focused on what kinds of appraisals people 
make of other’s misfortunes when they feel schadenfreude, as seen in this review of 
literature. However, little research has been done on how schadenfreude can affect decisions. 
To our knowledge, there is only one study published on the effect of schadenfreude on 
decisions (i.e., Kramer et al., 2011). Therefore, in the next sections, a discussion of how 
schadenfreude can affect decisions will be discussed. First, a discussion on the informational 
value emotions has on decisions and judgements will be presented. 
 
Feelings as Information 
 Feelings can serve as a source of information when making judgements. The feelings 
as information theory accounts for how moods, emotions, metacognitive experiences and 
bodily sensations influence judgement (Schwarz, 2010). An important distinction to make is 
between emotion and mood. Moods are emotional states that last for an extended period of 
time and lack a clear referent (Morris, 1989). Emotions, on the other hand, have an 
identifiable referent, are higher in intensity than moods, and last for shorter time periods. The 
difference in referents is incorporated in the English language as people say that one is in a 
bad mood, but one is angry about something (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). As the present thesis 
focus on the emotion schadenfreude, the discussion will focus mainly on how emotions serve 
as information in judgement tasks. 
 Emotions arise from appraisals (i.e., evaluations) of situations or events (Roseman & 
Smith, 2001). Put differently, emotions arise from how its referents are evaluated. According 
to the feeling as information theory, these appraisals are used as information in judgement 
tasks (Schwarz, 2010). So schadenfreude is evoked from situations where someone’s 
misfortune is appraised by the schadenfroh person as being beneficial for him or her (Frijda, 
1988). Such as seeing people fall from a seemingly undeserved high position (Feather, 2014), 
or to enhance one’s self-esteem (Van Dijk & Ouwerkerk, 2014).  
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 The appraisals of schadenfreude are then used in answering the question “how do I 
feel about it?” when using emotions as information in a judgement task (Schwarz & Clore, 
1988). Such as any other information source used in judgements, it follows the same rules 
(Schwarz, 2010). The first rule is that the emotion must have some informational value to the 
task at hand (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The literature distinguishes between integral emotions, 
which are elicited by the task at hand, and incidental emotions, which are present at the time 
(Schwarz & Clore, 2007). In order for the emotion to have informational value, it must be 
perceived as integral. However, these types of emotions are difficult to disentangle because 
people are not good at locating the source of their emotions, which makes people assume that 
all emotions are integral. Because of this, feeling as information experiments usually rely on 
the induction of incidental emotions. In order for the manipulation to be successful, the 
source of the emotion must not be disclosed (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  
 Second, the use of emotions as information increases when the emotions are relevant 
to the task at hand. Conversely, the impact of emotions in judgement tasks decreases when 
other more relevant sources of information are present. For example, an experiment assessing 
the effect of mood on liking of political candidates, Ottati and Isbell (1996) found that 
participants with expertise in politics were not affected by the mood manipulation in their 
evaluative judgements. Third, the use of emotions as information is pronounced in situations 
with limited processing capacity. By manipulating processing capacity with time constraints 
and an additional memory task, Siemer and Reisenzein (1998) found that participants low on 
processing capacity relied more on their mood when judging their life satisfaction. Lastly, the 
same emotion can affect judgements in different ways based on the question being asked. 
Happy and sad participants were asked whether they were satisfied with their progress in a 
task. Happy participants inferred that they were satisfied and terminated the task; sad 
participants were not satisfied and continued with the task. However, when they were asked 
whether they enjoyed a task, happy participants continued with the task, while sad 
participants terminated the task (Martin, Ward, Achée, & Wyer, 1993).  
 What kind of information does the emotion schadenfreude provide in judgement 
tasks? The research in this area has not been extensive. However, one study found that 
schadenfreude towards other’s misfortunes provides information about the possibility that the 
misfortune can happen to oneself (Kramer et al., 2011). Therefore, it is thought that 
participants appraised another person’s unfortunate event as satisfying because the other 
person deserved it. This appraisal of deservingness informed participants that the misfortune 
that had happened to someone else could also happen to them if they are not careful. With 
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this information in mind, participants then chose an option that was least likely to produce 
unfortunate outcomes, i.e., a conventional option. In Kramer et al.’s Study 1 (2011) it was a 
pair of binoculars with average magnification and weight that was chosen, instead of 
binoculars with either high magnification or light weight. In Kramer et al.’s Study 3 (2011) it 
was the choice of a sure gain of $30 instead of a risky option (10% probability to gain $750). 
Therefore, it seems that schadenfreude, the emotion that signals pleasure from other’s 
misfortunes, prevents people from making decisions that make them the subject of 
schadenfreude. Extrapolating from this study, the present thesis will investigate whether 
schadenfreude will affect decision-makers to choose conventional options in the ultimatum 
game and in risky gambles. A discussion of what constitutes a conventional option is 
presented next. 
 
Conventional and Unconventional Options 
 Conventional and unconventional options have many different characteristics. As 
mentioned in the previous section, a conventional option can be characterised as a middle 
option compared to the other options in the choice set. These are often called compromise 
options because one does not need to give up one attribute, such as magnification or weight, 
over another when making a decision (Simonson, 1989). Compromise options are often 
chosen because people place more emphasis on the disadvantages, than on the advantages, of 
extreme (unconventional) options (Simonson & Tversky, 1992). Because of this, 
unconventional options are easier to criticize (Kramer, Maimaran, & Simonson, 2012). In 
addition, participants who are held accountable for their decisions (Simonson & Nowlis, 
2000), and participants who anticipate evaluation of their choices (Maimaran & Simonson, 
2011) are more likely to choose compromise options. This is consistent with the predictions 
from Kramer et al.’s (2011) study where participants in the schadenfreude condition were 
attentive to the possibility of experiencing an unfortunate outcome, making them choose the 
compromise option. By choosing the compromise (conventional) option, they are less likely 
to be criticized and seen as less deserving of a potential unfortunate outcome because of their 
choice.  
 However, conventional options are not only options that involve a compromise. Other 
characteristics of conventional options are that they are chosen by the majority (Maimaran & 
Simonson, 2011). This might be because conventional options tend to satisfy lower-level 
needs (Maslow, 1970) and evoke less guilt (Keinan & Kivetz, 2008), which make them more 
consistent with social norms. In addition, conventional options have least perceived risk. 
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Therefore, when choosing between gambles that differ in risk, most people choose the 
gamble with no risk involved over the risky gamble (Simonson, Kramer, & Young, 2004). 
 
Ultimatum Game 
 Knowing the characteristics of conventional options, what is a conventional decision 
in the ultimatum game? First of all, an ultimatum game is a bargaining game between two 
participants, who are given the roles of a proposer and a responder. The proposer’s task is to 
divide a sum of money, such as $10, to the responder. The responder chooses to either accept 
or reject the division. If the division is accepted, both participants will receive the suggested 
allocation of money. However, if the responder chooses to reject the money, both participants 
will leave empty-handed (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). 
According to game theory, the players should act in a way that maximises value. 
Consequently, a conventional decision for the responder is to accept every offer. Similarly, a 
conventional decision for the proposer, according to game theory, is to allocate the smallest 
amount of money to the responder (Hardman, 2009). However, studies have shown that the 
majority of people do not make these decisions. A review of “one-shot” (i.e., one round) 
ultimatum games played around the world shows that the modal offer is 40-50% and the 
mean offer is 30-40% of the total. Offers below 20% of the total sum of money are rejected 
half the time, and offers of 40-50% are mostly accepted (Camerer, 2003). Therefore, it seems 
like the conventional decision is for the proposer is to allocate half of the total amount of 
money, and not the smallest amount possible. The present thesis will focus on the decisions 
of proposers, and not responders. This is because schadenfreude is thought to increase 
decision-makers’ attention towards the consequences of their choices, and the proposer’s 
decisions face immediate consequences in the ultimatum game. 
 The fair allocation of money by the proposers is explained by their aversion to 
inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Unfair allocations evoke more guilt in proposers 
(Ketelaar & Au, 2003), which makes them willing to give more to responders in order create 
equitable outcomes in the ultimatum game (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). However, the norm of 
fairness might not be the only reason proposers allocate 40-50% of the total amount. When 
responders do not have the opportunity to reject offers (e.g., in dictator games, Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986) proposers allocated 24% of the total amount to responders 
(Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994). Therefore, the fair allocations in ultimatum 
games are not only due to fairness norms, but also due to strategic concerns where proposers 
anticipate responders’ reactions to unfair offers and therefore give fair offers (Wells & Rand, 
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2012). For example, in an alternative ultimatum game, responders were given 30 cents no 
matter the outcome. However, only proposers knew this and when allocating the money, they 
still gave 50% of the total (i.e., 15 cents). This shows that proposers are motivated by 
strategic self-interest when allocating the money fairly, i.e., if they don’t allocate the money 
fairly, they risk not getting any money (Wells & Rand, 2012). 
Fair allocation in the ultimatum game can thus be seen as the conventional option 
because it is seen as the norm (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), is selected by the majority (Camerer, 
2003), and is seen as the option that has the least perceived risk of being rejected (Wells & 
Rand, 2012). Therefore, the emotion schadenfreude is expected to make proposers allocate 
more fairly in the ultimatum game.  
 
Risky Gambles and Framing 
 The absence of risk involved in the conventional options has been the main focus of 
discussion for the two previous decision tasks. However, when it comes to risky gambles, a 
conventional option is not necessarily the option with the lowest risk. How can a risky option 
be perceived as a conventional option and how can the information provided by 
schadenfreude affect decision-makers to choose risky options? 
Risky options are often chosen when these are framed in terms of losses. Consider 
this gamble: “Option A: Sure loss of $750. Option B: 75% chance to lose $1000 and 25% 
chance to lose nothing” (p. 454 Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Most of the participants chose 
option B where participants had a chance of not losing anything, however there was also a 
chance that they could lose more than if they had chosen option A. According to prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), this is because people are sensitive to losses and 
overweigh high probabilities, but underweigh middle probabilities. Therefore, the probability 
of .75 to lose $1000 has the lowest perceived loss of value, making this option more 
attractive than the sure loss of $750. On the other hand, when gambles are framed in terms of 
gains, prospect theory predicts that most decision-makers will choose the safe option. 
Consider the same gamble, but framed in terms of gains: Option A: Sure gain of $250. 
Option B: 25% probability to gain $1000 and 75% probability to not gain anything. The 
majority chooses option A because decision-makers are aversive of the possibility to losses, 
and in option B there is a possibility of a loss, making option A the most attractive option. 
These types of gambles are often referred as economic versions of the Asian disease problem 
because these are economic adaptions of the original framing problem, called Asian disease 
problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
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Kramer et al. (2011, Study 3) has shown that schadenfreude induced participants 
chose the safe (conventional) option in a gain framed gamble, which is in line with the 
predictions on how schadenfreude affects decisions. However, what about the decisions made 
in loss framed gambles? The discussion above indicates that the majority chooses the risky 
option because of the higher perceived value and because of decision-makers’ aversion to 
losses. In addition Kramer et al. (2011) suggests, “that for gambles involving losses, the risky 
option is the conventional one” (p. 141). Therefore, people who feel schadenfreude might 
also lean toward a risky option, as one might be seen as less deserving of a misfortune by 
choosing an option with a possibility of not losing anything rather than choosing an option 
with a sure loss. In addition, due to the loss aversion seen in decision-makers, the risky option 
in the loss frame is perhaps seen as the less risky option as there is a possibility of not losing 
anything. It is therefore predicted that schadenfreude will affect decision-makers to choose 
risky options in the loss frame, and safe options in the gain frame. 
 
Aims of the Present Research 
 The literature on schadenfreude has focused mainly on the antecedent triggers of this 
emotion, and little research has been done on how schadenfreude can affect behaviour. 
Decision-making researchers have also failed to investigate how schadenfreude affects 
decisions, where some are now urging for this to be done (Ketelaar, 2006). As seen in the 
introductory example with Apple and Samsung, schadenfreude is a commonly occurring 
emotion in situations of competition. Therefore, it is important to understand the behavioural 
consequences of this emotion. Based on this, the aim of the present thesis is to investigate 
how schadenfreude affects decisions in the ultimatum game, risky gambles, and consumer 
contexts. This is an extension of Kramer et al.’s (2011) study where they looked at how 
schadenfreude affects consumer choices, and choice of risky gambles. The choice options 
were categorised as either conventional or unconventional, and Kramer et al. (2011) found 
that schadenfreude increases the likelihood of people choosing conventional options.  
 Extrapolating on this, four studies were conducted with the hypothesis that 
schadenfreude will make people choose more conventional options. In order to make sure 
that the schadenfreude induction is effective, a pre-test was conducted to select a video clip 
that induces the most schadenfreude. The first two studies investigated the effect of 
schadenfreude on decisions in the ultimatum game, where it was expected that schadenfreude 
would make proposers allocate more fairly compared to proposers in the control condition. 
As the results from these studies showed no significant differences, Study 3 used the same 
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induction method as in Kramer et al. (2011) to investigate whether schadenfreude affects 
choices of risky gambles in the gain and loss frame. Following the predictions from Kramer 
et al. (2011), it was expected that participants in the schadenfreude condition would choose 
the sure option in the gain frame, and the risky option in the loss frame more often than 
participants than in the control condition. Lastly, Study 4 was conducted where a direct 
replication of Kramer et al.’s (2011, Study 1) study was conducted, as Study 3 did not find a 
significant difference in choices between the schadenfreude and control condition. It was 
expected that participants in the schadenfreude condition would choose the compromise 
option more often than participants in the control condition.   
 
Pre-test 
 The pre-test was conducted in order to make sure that the video clip used in the next 
studies elicits schadenfreude. Video clips were used because this method can present 
dynamic situations that combine auditory and visual stimuli (Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, 
Philippot, 2010). This then enables the elicitation of discrete emotions, and not only moods 
(Gross & Levenson, 1995). Most importantly, video clips are most effective in inducing 
affective states compared to other techniques (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse 1996).  
The scale used to measure schadenfreude in the pre-test is also used in subsequent studies, 
which is Van Dijk et al.’s (2005) schadenfreude and sympathy scale. This scale was selected 
because of its advantage of measuring the subtleties of schadenfreude, and using whole 
sentences and not only emotion terms in doing so.  
 Many studies have proposed the use of standardised video clips that can be used in 
emotion research (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Philippot, 1993; Schaefer et al., 2010). 
However, these have focused on the elicitation of the primary emotions, which means that 
there is no standardised video clip to elicit schadenfreude. This pre-test has therefore tested a 
selection of video clips on the level of elicited schadenfreude, whereas one video clip was 
selected for the use in the two subsequent studies.   
 
Method 
Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited through social media sites 
and e-mail to participate in an on-line study. 134 participants had submitted a questionnaire. 
However, 44 of these did not answer any of the dependent variables and were excluded from 
the analyses. Therefore, 90 participants were included in the analyses (52% women). The 
mean age was 26.39 (SD = 6.46). The pre-test was given in Norwegian (N=47) and English 
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(N=44). One video (Video 4) had different sympathy scores between the Norwegian (M = 
1.61) and English (M = 2.43) questionnaires, t(60.92) = 3.88, p < .001, d = 1.878. Due to only 
one video having differences based on language, the results from the two questionnaires were 
combined. Respondents were situated in various countries. All participants had completed 
high school or equivalent, and more than half had a Bachelor’s degree or higher.  
All participants saw eight video clips presented in random order and were asked 
questions regarding these after each video clip. 
Materials. Video clips. The video clips were taken from YouTube, an online video-
sharing site. A total of 36 videos were first selected. These videos ranged from clips of 
people hurting themselves because of their own bad decisions, to celebrities making fools of 
themselves, to very poor performances in singing competitions. Out of the 36 video clips, 12 
video clips were picked as favourites. The video clips were discussed in regard to the length 
of the video clip, and whether it elicits schadenfreude. Finally, eight video clips were selected 
for the pre-test. A short description of each video clip is given.  
Both Video 1 and Video 2 shows failed auditions to the UK version of X-Factor, 
which is a televised singing competition. Both video clips were of people who could not sing 
and were therefore ridiculed by the judges, and a live audience. These video clips were 
selected for the pre-test because videos of failed auditions have been previously used in 
schadenfreude research (e.g., Van Dijk et al., 2012). Video 3 is of a cyclist competing in Le 
Tour de France. As the cyclist is approaching the finish line, he lifts his hands from the 
handlebar in celebration. However, he stumbles and falls off his bicycle allowing the cyclist 
behind him win the stage. Video 4 is of a man fishing with his dog. The man tries to push the 
dog into the water with his foot, but in the process he falls in the water himself and not the 
dog. Video 5 is of a boy who pours some kind of flammable liquid on his trousers (around the 
crotch area), and lights his trousers on fire. The boy starts to panic when the fire doesn’t 
extinguish easily, however the boy manages to put out the flames in the end. Video 6 is of a 
man who pushes a wheelbarrow up an incline and the wheelbarrow with its contents pours 
over the man. Video 7 is of a boy making his pet frog play a game on his phone. The game is 
to crush ants that are walking on the screen, and the frog probably thinks it’s food. When the 
game ends, the boy uses his thumb to exit the game, and the frog bites his thumb. Lastly, 
Video 8 is from a Miss Teen USA pageant where Miss Teen South Carolina horribly fails at 
answering the question of why American pupils are bad at geography (the links to these 
videos can be found in Appendix A).  
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The combined length of these videos is 9 minutes 10 seconds, whereas the shortest 
video is 19 seconds (Video 3) and the longest is 3 minutes 10 seconds (Video 2). Previous 
research has also used video clips that vary in length, from 30 seconds to 8 minutes 
(Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007).  
Schadenfreude scale. Van Dijk’s measure of schadenfreude and sympathy was used 
(c.f. Van Dijk et al., 2005). The scale assesses schadenfreude through five statements (“I 
enjoy what happened to...”, “I’m satisfied with what happened to...”, “I couldn’t resist a little 
smile”, “I actually had to laugh a bit”, and “I feel schadenfreude”) , and sympathy through 
three statements (“I commiserate with... about what happened”, “I feel sorry for what 
happened to...”, and “I sympathize with...”). Participants were asked to what extent they 
agree with these statements on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = 
strongly agree. This scale was translated into Norwegian by having two people translate the 
English version to Norwegian. Differences in translations were resolved through discussion 
(see Appendix B for the Norwegian translation of the scale). 
 Questions about the video clips. Participants were asked if they had seen the video 
clip before. In addition, they were asked if they would see the video clip at home, and if they 




 Analyses focus on respondent’s answers on the schadenfreude and sympathy scales. 
The responses from the 5 schadenfreude statements (α = .899) and 3 sympathy statements (α 
= .909) were averaged for every video.  
 Mean ratings. The output from the paired samples t-test comparing the 
schadenfreude and sympathy scores are seen in Table 1. Some of the videos produced 
unexpected results; such as participants felt more sympathy than schadenfreude towards the 
cyclist in Video 3, (Msym = 5.05, Mscha = 2.57) t(84) = -8.549, p < .001, d = -1.637, and the 
man with the wheelbarrow in Video 6, (Msym = 4.48, Mscha = 2.96)  t(81) = -4.869, p < .001, d 
= -.913. In addition, four videos had no difference between schadenfreude and sympathy 
scores (all p > .05). However, Video 4 and Video 7 produced the expected results. 
Participants felt more schadenfreude (M = 5) than sympathy (M = 1.99) towards the man in 
Video 4, t(82) = 13.695, p < .001, d = 2.362. Participants also felt more schadenfreude (M = 
4.14) than sympathy (M = 2.6) towards the boy in Video 7, t(82) =  5.203, p < .001, d = .946. 
The mean schadenfreude and sympathy scores for every video (except Video 8) had a 
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Summary of paired samples t-test results from the pre-test 
 Schadenfreude Sympathy t-value Cohen’s d Correlation 
Video 1 3.25 3.34 -.341 -.062 -.322** 
Video 2 3.24 3.32 -.276 -.051 -.346** 
Video 3 2.57 5.05 -8.549** -1.637 -.559** 
Video 4 5.00 1.99 13.695** 2.362 -.234* 
Video 5 2.78 2.90 -.402 -.074 -.356** 
Video 6 2.96 4.48 -4.869** -.913 -.442** 
Video 7 4.14 2.60 5.203** .946 -.372** 
Video 8 3.55 3.15 1.487 .247 -.177 
Note. * indicates a significance level of p < .05, ** indicates a significance level of p < .01. 
 
 Discussion 
 The main objective of this pre-test was to select a video that would be used in 
subsequent studies. The results from this pre-test show that one video clearly elicits the most 
schadenfreude and the least sympathy, which is Video 4 where a man tries to push a dog into 
the water, but falls in himself. In addition, the schadenfreude score for Video 4 is high 
compared to schadenfreude scores obtained in other studies (e.g., M = 3.16 in Van Dijk et al., 
2008, M = 2.70 in Van Dijk et al., 2005, M = 4.75 in Van Dijk et al., 2012). Video 4 will be 
therefore used to induce schadenfreude in the next studies. However, there was a significant 
difference in sympathy scores between Norwegian and English responses in Video 4, where 
respondents of the English questionnaire felt more sympathy than respondents of the 
Norwegian questionnaire. Compared to sympathy scores for the other videos, the sympathy 
English respondents felt for the man in Video 4 was still lower than the sympathy felt in the 
other videos. Therefore, Video 4 was the best choice.  
 The fact that Video 4 elicited the most schadenfreude is supported by previous 
research. The man in Video 4 is seen as deserving of the misfortune because his own actions 
lead to the misfortune (Feather, 2006). The man’s actions were negative because he tried to 
push the dog into the water, and this previous negative action lead to a negative outcome, i.e., 
him falling into the water. In addition, because the man was responsible for his own outcome 
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(he didn’t fall into the water because of anyone else than himself), the perceived 
deservingness increases (Van Dijk et al., 2005). In line with Video 7, which came second in 
eliciting the most schadenfreude, Video 4 depicts a light form of animal cruelty. This 
behaviour is often associated with “dark” personality traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, 
and psychopathy, Kavanagh, Signal, & Taylor, 2013), and might have negatively affected the 
perceived likeableness of the man in Video 4 and the boy in Video 7. It is argued that the 
protagonists in these videos were seen not likeable, making their misfortunes seen as even 
more deserved, which lead to increased feelings of schadenfreude (Hareli & Weiner, 2002). 
 
Study 1 
 Study 1 used the video selected in the pre-test to induce schadenfreude. The aim of 
this study was to investigate whether decisions made by the proposer in the ultimatum game 
are affected by schadenfreude. The hypothesis is that participants in the schadenfreude 
condition will give fairer allocations (i.e., 50% of the total) than participants in the control 
condition. Because of the fleeting nature of emotions (Schwarz & Clore, 2007), a one-shot 
paradigm of the ultimatum game was used. Given that the present study was only interested 
in the decisions of proposers, coupled with the lack of funds, all allocations were rejected. In 
order to make the experimental situation believable, a confederate was present in the lab. 
However, participants were lead to believe that they were going to be paid according to the 
outcome of the ultimatum game (see ethics section for discussion). The reason why a 
confederate was used instead of telling participants that they were playing against another 
person situated elsewhere, was to make sure that participants believed they played against 
another person. This is important as studies where measures to ensure anonymity have lead 
participants to doubt whether they were actually playing against a real person, which then 
affected participants’ allocation in dictator games (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Moore, 2001). 
The decision of making participants believe that they were paid according to the outcome of 
the ultimatum game was made because financial incentives have shown to improve people’s 
performance in economic games (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). 
 
Method 
 Participants. There were 49 participants recruited at the University of Oslo’s 
Department of Psychology, and all were given a candy bar as compensation. Participants 
(N=7) that had guessed the purpose of the study were excluded from the analyses. This is 
because the emotion’s informational value was discounted, as participants knew that the 
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emotion is incidental and not integral (Schwarz, 2010). Therefore, 42 participants (73.8% 
women) with mean age 24.02 (SD = 5.32) were included in the analyses. All participants had 
completed high school, and a quarter had completed a Bachelor’s degree or higher. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2(affect prime: Schadenfreude vs Neutral) between 
subjects condition. 
 Materials and procedure. The experiment was conducted in the social psychology 
lab in the Psychology Department at the University of Oslo. Participants were told that they 
were participating in two separate experiments, whereas one experiment was disguised as an 
experiment on videos and emotions, and the other experiment was disguised as an experiment 
on decision-making. A confederate was present during the experiment. In order to convince 
participants into believing that the confederate was a participant, all participants were met in 
a common-area of the Psychology Department and walked up to the lab. During the short 
walk to the lab, the experimenter told the participants that the other participant was already 
waiting in the lab. When the participant entered the lab, the confederate’s back was seen. The 
confederate and the participant sat in the cubicles spaced furthest apart, and the experimenter 
sat in the middle cubicle.  
 The experiment was conducted using Qualtrics. Participants were randomly selected 
into experimental and control conditions. In the experimental condition, participants saw the 
video that elicited the most schadenfreude in the pre-test (a man and his dog). In the control 
condition, participants saw a neutral video of two men talking (links to the videos are found 
in Appendix C). After watching the video, participants responded to the same schadenfreude 
scale as used in the pre-test (see Appendix B), and to the same general questions about the 
video clip (see materials section in the pre-test). 
 Afterwards, participants were asked to participate in the second experiment. A 
welcome message was presented, and the participants were asked to press a button in order 
for them to connect to the second player. After a loading time of 15 seconds, participants 
were asked to play a one-shot ultimatum game (see Appendix D for the instructions given). 
Every participant was allocated the role of Player number 1 (i.e., proposer), and was therefore 
led to believe that the confederate was Player number 2 (i.e., responder). Participants were 
asked to write down the amount (out of 100 NOK) they wanted to allocate to Player number 
2. As the purpose of the experiment was to look at allocations in the ultimatum game, all 
allocations were rejected. Demographic information was collected and participants were 





 The scores from the 5 schadenfreude statements (α = .791) and 3 sympathy statements 
(α = .774) were averaged for the schadenfreude video and the neutral video.  
Manipulation check. In order to determine whether the manipulation was successful, 
an independent samples t-test was conducted comparing the schadenfreude and sympathy 
scores between the schadenfreude and control conditions. There was a significant difference 
in schadenfreude elicited between the schadenfreude video (M = 4.81) and the neutral video 
(M = 2.95), t(40) = -5.402, p < .001, d = -1.669. However, the difference in sympathy scores 
between the schadenfreude (M = 2.83) and the neutral video (M = 3.35) was not significant, 
t(40) = 1.385, p = .174, d = .428. The schadenfreude and sympathy scores in the 
schadenfreude condition was negatively correlated r = -.426, however this did not reach 
significance (p = .061). In the control condition, the correlation between the schadenfreude 
and sympathy scores was not significant (r = .334, p = .128).  
 Allocation of money. An independent samples t-test was conducted in order to test 
the hypothesis that the allocation of money is expected to be fairer in the schadenfreude 
condition compared to the neutral condition. The analysis showed there was no significant 
difference in the allocation of money in the ultimatum game between the schadenfreude 
condition (M = 48 NOK) and the neutral condition (M = 45.32 NOK), t(40) = .691, p = .493, 
d = .213, but the difference was in the expected direction. However, there was not much 
variability in the allocations. As seen in Table 2, the modal amount allocated was 50 NOK 
where 73.8% of participants allocated half of the money to Player 2. However, 63.6% of 
males allocated 50 NOK to Player 2, whereas 80.6% of females allocated the same amount or 
more to Player 2. An independent samples t-test was conducted to see whether there was a 
difference in the allocation of money between males (M = 42.45 NOK) and females (M = 
48.06 NOK) across conditions. However this the difference was not significant, t(40) = -












Frequency table of allocations (out of 100 NOK) made in the Ultimatum Game 
(Study 1) 






20 1   (9.1%) 2   (6.5%) 7.1% 
30 2   (18.2%) 3   (3.2%) 7.1% 
37 1   (9.1%) 0   (0.0%) 2.4% 
40 0   (0.0%) 3   (9.7%) 7.1% 
50 7   (63.6%) 24 (77.4%) 73.8% 
100 0   (0.0%) 1   (3.2%) 2.4% 
Total 11  (100%) 31 (100%) 100% 
  
Discussion 
 The result from Study 1 shows that the experimental manipulation used was 
successful, in that the video selected made participants feel more schadenfreude than the 
neutral video. However, the results showed that allocations to Player 2 in the ultimatum game 
did not significantly differ between schadenfreude and neutral conditions, but the small 
difference was in the expected direction. The hypothesis was therefore not supported, and the 
results from Study 1 cannot provide evidence for schadenfreude having an effect on the 
allocation of money in the ultimatum game. 
 The results from Study 1 show a similar pattern of results as other studies where 
proposers’ median allocation is 50% of the total sum (Camerer, 2003; Güth et al., 1982). 
However, the percentage (73.8%) of fair offers was higher than seen in previous studies. For 
example, in Güth et al. (1982) only 43% of participants gave fair offers, and in Larrick and 
Blount (1997) 57% of participants gave fair offers. This might be due to the homogenous 
sample used in our study where almost three-quarters of the participants were women and 
that almost all participants were psychology students. Participants’ subject area has shown to 
produce differences in the outcome of ultimatum games, where for example economics 
students allocate less money to responders compared to psychology students (Carter & Irons, 
1991; Kahneman et al., 1986).  
 The use of a confederate where participants were able to identify the person they are 
allocating the money to might also have affected the results. In fact, studies have shown that 
female responders are usually allocated less money compared to male responders (Eckel & 
Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001). However, as the allocations in this study were very fair, we 
doubt that there would be a difference in allocations (i.e., larger percent of fair allocations) if 
the confederate were a man. Regardless of gender, the confederate might have evoked 
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participants to allocate fairly because they had an “identifiable victim” (Bohnet & Frey, 1998, 
p. 339). However, social distance of players has only shown to affect allocations in dictator 
games (e.g., Bohnet & Frey, 1998; Charness & Gneezy, 2008), where Player 2 can only 
punish Player 1 through social sanctions. Considering the large proportion of fair allocations 
seen in Study 1, the next study will use a more diverse sample from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, and an identifiable confederate will not be used in order to see whether this also 
affected the results in Study 1.  
 
Study 2 
The aim of Study 2 was to replicate Study 1 while using a more diverse sample of 
participants, in an attempt to test the hypothesis. Participants in Study 2 were playing for real 
money, as all of the allocations were accepted and paid in full. However, the amount they 
were playing for was 1 USD, a much lower amount than used in Study 1. Even though the 
amount is low, it is shown that 1 USD ultimatum games conducted in Amazon Mechanical 
Turk are comparable to results found in laboratories (Amir, Rand, & Gal, 2012). Therefore, 
the hypothesis is that participants in the schadenfreude condition are expected to allocate 
fairer (i.e., 50% of the total) than participants in the control condition.  
 
Method 
 Participants. There were 99 participants that had completed the study. Participants 
were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and were paid a flat rate of 40 cents/0.40 
USD in addition to the outcome of the 1 USD ultimatum game. However, 14 participants 
guessed the purpose of the study (Schwarz, 2010), and 4 participants failed to answer the 
instructional manipulation check correctly (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). 
Therefore, 81 participants were included in the analyses (39.5% women). The mean age of 
the participants was 33.85 (SD = 11.03). All participants were American with the exception 
of two who were British and Irish. The largest proportion of participants had completed 
college or was in college, while 18.5% had only completed high school. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a 2(affect prime: Schadenfreude vs Neutral) between subjects design. 
Materials and procedure. The experiment was conducted using Qualtrics and the 
survey was posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The same materials were used as 
in Study 1, but in English (see Appendix D for the instructions given in the ultimatum game 
and Appendix C for links to the schadenfreude and neutral video). Contrary to the procedure 
in Study 1, all allocations were accepted, and a confederate was not used. However, 
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participants were still lead to believe that they were playing against a real participant. The 
same information was given as in Study 1, such as asking participants to wait for 15 seconds 
in order to connect with another participant. As real ultimatum game experiments are 
conducted on MTurk (e.g., Wells & Rand, 2012) we believed that most participants would 
find it plausible. 
 
Results 
 The scores for the 5 schadenfreude statements (α = .883) and 3 sympathy statements 
(α = .795) were averaged for the schadenfreude and neutral videos.  
 Manipulation check. An independent samples t-test, which compared the average 
scores of schadenfreude between the schadenfreude video and the neutral video, was 
conducted. There was a significant difference between the schadenfreude scores for the 
schadenfreude video (M = 4.77) and the neutral video (M = 3.53), t(79) = -3.860, p < .001, d 
= -.859. However, there was no significant difference in sympathy scores between the 
schadenfreude (M = 3.68) and neutral (M = 3.5) video, t(79) = -.543, p = .589, d = -.121. 
There was a significant negative correlation between schadenfreude and sympathy scores in 
the schadenfreude condition r = -.363, p = .025, indicating that the more schadenfreude 
participants experienced, the less sympathy they felt. In the neutral condition, there was a 
significant positive correlation between schadenfreude and sympathy scores r = .323, p = 
.035, which then indicates that when sympathy scores increase, schadenfreude scores 
decrease. 
 Allocation of money. The amount of money allocated to Player 2 was compared 
between the schadenfreude and neutral conditions by using an independent samples t-test. 
There was a non-significant difference between the amount of money allocated in the 
schadenfreude condition (M = 42.26 cents) and the neutral condition (M = 43.88 cents), t(79) 
= .459, p = .648, d = .102. In addition, the difference was not in the predicted direction. The 
modal allocation was 50 cents where 61.7% of participants across conditions allocated this 
amount. Of the male participants, 57.1% allocated 50 cents, and of the female participants, 
68.8% allocated 50 cents. However, the difference in allocations between males (M = 43.69 
cents) and females (M = 42.25 cents) was not significant, t(79) = .400, p = .690, d = .091.  
 Comparison of the results from Study 1 and Study 2. In order investigate whether 
the allocation of money in the ultimatum game was different between Study 1 and Study 2, 
an independent samples t-test was conducted. Allocations from both experiments were out of 
100 (NOK in Study 1 and cents in Study 2), which made the allocations comparable. The 
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results from the t-test indicate that there is no significant difference in the allocations between 




 The results from Study 2 are similar to those of Study 1 where the manipulation was 
successful, but there was no significant difference in allocation of money between the 
schadenfreude and neutral conditions. However, the non-significant difference in Study 2 was 
not in the predicted direction, which is contrary to the results in Study 1. In addition, the 
allocations made in the ultimatum game were not significantly different between Study 1 and 
Study 2 even though different amounts of money were used. These results corroborate with 
Amir et al.’s (2012) finding where 1 USD ultimatum games on MTurk produce similar 
results to ultimatum games in laboratories with higher amounts of money. These results also 
show that the small social distance between the proposer and responder, and the gender of the 
confederate in Study 1, did not affect participants to allocate more fairly.   
 Kramer et al. (2011) found that schadenfreude led to the anticipation of unfavourable 
outcomes, which then led participants to choose conventional options. The ultimatum game 
seemed ideal to test these predictions further, as proposers are faced with the consequences of 
their decisions right away. However, as Study 1 and 2 did not find an effect of schadenfreude 
on decisions, Kramer et al.’s (2011) predictions might not be applicable to the ultimatum 
game. A possible reason is that the informational value of schadenfreude might have been 
overridden by other, more salient sources of information, such as the anticipation of how 
Player 2 will respond to offers (Wells & Rand, 2012). The ultimatum game is inherently 
social, whereas risky gambles are not, and the outcome of gambles are due to chance and not 
other people. Therefore, a conceptual replication of Kramer et al.’s (2011, Study 3) study was 
conducted where a similar decision task was used, in order to further investigate whether 
schadenfreude does affect decisions. 
 
Study 3 
 As the two previous studies did not find an effect of schadenfreude on decisions in the 
ultimatum game, a decision task similar to Kramer et al.’s (2011, Study 3) decision task was 
used. The first aim of Study 3 was to extend Kramer et al.’s (2011, Study 3) findings to 
investigate risky choices in both the loss and gain frame. Kramer et al. (2011) found that, 
when presented with safe or risky gambles, participants in the schadenfreude condition chose 
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the safe option more often than participants in the calm condition. The gamble was framed in 
terms of gains, and the effect of schadenfreude on choice of the safe option was mediated 
through anticipation of unfavourable outcomes. However, when gambles are framed in terms 
of losses, the risky option is most often chosen (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Kramer et al. 
(2011) argue that the risky option in a loss frame is a conventional option. Therefore, the 
hypothesis in Study 3 is that choice of conventional options (i.e., safe options when these are 
presented as gains, and risky options when these are presented as losses) will be chosen more 
often in the schadenfreude condition compared to the control condition, and this effect is 
mediated through anticipation of unfavourable outcomes.    
 As the previous studies did not find a difference in decisions when using a video clip 
to elicit emotions, we decided to use the same affective priming task as used in Kramer et al. 
(2011). Studies that investigate how feelings affect decisions have used affective priming 
tasks successfully (Kramer et al., 2011; Pham, 1998). In addition, researchers have started 
recently using affective priming tasks more often because this procedure elicits emotions 
from personal events (Salas, Radovic, & Turnbull, 2012).  
 
Method 
 Participants. There were 132 undergraduate students who took part in the experiment 
through the University of Oslo’s Research Pool in exchange for course credit. However, 61 
participants were excluded due to either incomplete answers (i.e., not answering the 
dependent variables) (N = 31); correctly guessed the purpose of the experiment (N = 15); or 
did not wish to have their results analysed (N = 15). Therefore, 71 participants were included 
in the analyses (70% women). The mean age was 22.69 (SD = 6.22), and all participants had 
completed high school whereas a quarter of these also had a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2(affect prime: Schadenfreude vs Calm) x 
2(question frame: Gain vs Loss) between-subjects design.  
 Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to part-take in two ostensibly 
unrelated studies, titled “experiences and emotions” and “decisions under uncertainty”.  
The first study was explained to participants as a study that looks at how different 
experiences make people feel different emotions. The real purpose of this part of the study 
was to induce participants to either feel schadenfreude or calm through an affective priming 
task. The calm condition was used as a control. In the schadenfreude condition, participants 
were asked to spend up to 5 minutes thinking about an event that affected them personally 
and made them feel happy when someone else who deserved it did badly at a particular task. 
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In the calm (control) condition, participants were instead asked to think about an event that 
affected them personally and made them feel calm because someone else completed a task. 
Afterwards, participants were asked to write about the event in as much detail and as vividly 
as possible. In order to determine if the manipulation was successful, participants were asked 
to respond to the Norwegian translation of Van Dijk’s measure of schadenfreude and 
sympathy by using a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix B).  
Participants were then asked to part-take in the second study, which was an economic 
version of the Asian Disease problem. In this study, participants were asked to choose 
between two options, whereas one involved some risk, and the other did not (the problems 
were taken from Teigen & Nikolaisen, 2009). They were asked to imagine that they have 
invested 600 000 NOK in a company that is now on the brink of bankruptcy. Participants in 
the gain frame condition were presented with two alternatives that were communicated in 
terms of gains: Sure gain of 200 000 NOK, or 1/3 probability of saving the whole sum and 
2/3 probability to save nothing. Participants in the loss frame had the same options in terms 
of pay-offs, but framed in terms of losses: Sure loss of 400 000 NOK or 1/3 probability of 
nothing will be lost and 2/3 probability that the whole sum will be lost (see Appendix E for 
the instructions given). In order to investigate whether the choice of conventional options are 
mediated through anticipation of unfavourable outcomes, participants answered three 
questions relating to this (adapted from Scheier & Carver, 1985). These questions were: “If 
something goes wrong for me, it will”, “things never work out the way I want them to”, and 
“I rarely count on good things happening to me” (see Appendix F for the Norwegian 
translations of the scale). A 5-point Likert scale (where 0 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly 
agree) was used. Practical questions regarding whether participants were distracted during 
the experiment and whether they answered the questions seriously were asked. Lastly, 
participants were thanked and debriefed.  
 
Results 
 The scores from the 5 schadenfreude statements (α = .679) and 3 sympathy statements 
(α = .708) were averaged for the schadenfreude condition and for the calm condition. The 
scores from the anticipation of unfavourable outcomes scale were also averaged (α = .742). 
The dependent variable (choice of safe or risky options) was recoded representing choice of 
conventional or unconventional options. Therefore, the choice of the risky option in the loss 
frame was given the same code as the choice of a safe option in the gain frame, representing 
choice of a conventional option.  
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 Manipulation check. An independent samples t-test comparing the schadenfreude 
and sympathy scores between the calm and schadenfreude conditions was conducted. There 
was a significant difference in schadenfreude scores between the calm (M = 3.99) and the 
schadenfreude (M = 4.75), t(69) = 2.586, p = .012, r, d = .615. In addition, there was a 
significant difference in sympathy scores between the schadenfreude (M = 2.55) and the calm 
(M = 3.77) condition, t(68) = -3.732, p < .001, d = -.894.  
 Choice of conventional versus unconventional option. A three-way hierarchical 
loglinear analysis with the categorical dependent variable choice (conventional or 
unconventional), and the categorical independent variables emotion (schadenfreude or calm), 
and frame (gain or loss) was conducted. The three-way interaction of Choice x Emotion x 
Frame was not significant, χ2 (1) = .1.039, p = .308. To break down the three-way interaction 
and find which two-way interaction was not significant, separate Chi-squared tests were 
conducted. A 2 x 2 Chi-squared test did not show a significant association between emotion 
felt and choice of risky or safe options, χ2 (1) = .338, p = .621, Φ = .069, not supporting the 
hypothesis that schadenfreude affects choice of conventional options. However, the Choice x 
Frame interaction in the hierarchical loglinear analysis was significant, χ2 (1) = 10.759, p = 
.001. Accordingly, a 2 x 2 Chi-squared test shows that there is a significant association 
between how the options were framed and which option was chosen, χ2 (1) = 10.68, p = .001, 
Φ = .388, replicating previous framing studies. Most participants (83.8%) chose the 
conventional (i.e., safe option) in the gain frame, but in the loss frame 47.1% of participants 
chose the conventional (i.e., risky) option. 
 Mediation analysis. Following Kramer et al. (2011), a mediation analysis was 
conducted to investigate whether the anticipation of unfavourable outcomes mediates the 
effect of schadenfreude (independent variable) on the choice of conventional or 
unconventional options (dependent variable). Baron & Kenny’s (1986) causal steps 
mediation analysis shows that mediation is demonstrated through three steps: First, that there 
is a significant effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Second, there is 
a significant effect of the independent variable on the mediator variable (anticipation of 
unfavourable outcomes). Third, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable is no longer significant in a regression analysis with the independent and mediator 
variables. A bimodal logistic regression shows that the emotion felt did not affect choice of 
conventional and unconventional options, β = -.294 (SE = .507), Wald’s χ2 (1) = .337, p = 
.562, not satisfying the first criterion of mediation between schadenfreude and anticipation of 
unfavourable outcomes. Testing the second criterion, a regression analysis was conducted 
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with emotion as the independent variable and the anticipation of unfavourable outcomes scale 
as the dependent variable. This analysis did not show a significant effect of emotion on 
anticipation of unfavourable outcomes, β = -.152, t(69) = -1.279, p = .205. This means that 
the anticipation of unfavourable outcomes does not mediate the effect of schadenfreude on 
the choice of conventional and unconventional options, as the two first criterions were not 
satisfied, making it unnecessary to test the third criterion.  
 
Discussion 
 The results from Study 3 show that there is an association between the framing of the 
options and the choice of conventional or unconventional options. Compared to previous 
framing studies, more participants than expected chose the unconventional (i.e., risky) option 
in the loss frame: 47% chose the risky option in Study 3 whereas 87% chose the risky option 
in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981, Problem 3) study. However, the emotions felt did not 
affect the choice of conventional or unconventional options, despite the manipulation check 
indicating that participants felt schadenfreude in the experimental condition. In addition, 
mediation analyses showed that anticipation of unfavourable outcomes does not mediate the 
effect of choice through emotions felt.  
 A possible explanation for the non-significant effect of emotions on choice is that the 
choice task might have made participants feel negative affect, which then overrode the 
emotions felt after the affective priming task. In both the gain and loss frames, participants 
were presented with a scenario where they were about to lose a large sum of money. A study 
showed that when participants were presented with a scenario where they either had to cut 
their wage or were not given a bonus, they felt more negative towards the wage cut 
(Liberman, Idson, & Higgins, 2005). Therefore, as the choice task in the present study 
presented a scenario of loss, and not prevention of gain, participants’ emotions might have 
been affected by the task.  
 Study 3 was conducted in order to investigate whether schadenfreude affects 
decisions by using decision tasks closer to Kramer et al.’s (2011) study. The results from this 
study did not support these hypotheses. However, as the design of Study 3 was not exactly 
the same as in Kramer et al.’s (2011, Study 3) study, the null-finding might have been 
because of flaws in the design. Such as the three previous studies has used the same 
schadenfreude scale, whereas Kramer et al. (2011) has used a scale that measures overall 
positive and negative affect. In order to overcome this problem, a direct replication of 
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Kramer et al.’s (2011, Study 1) study was conducted where the exact same methods were 
used.  
   
Study 4 
 The aim of Study 4 was to replicate Kramer et al.’s (2011, Study 1) findings where 
they found that participants feeling schadenfreude chose more compromise options than 
happy (i.e., control) participants. It was then expected that participants in the schadenfreude 
condition would choose the compromise option more often than participants in the control 
(happy) condition. In order to determine whether participants were feeling schadenfreude or 
happiness, their positive and negative affect was measured. According to Kramer et al. 
(2011), schadenfreude consists of a mixture of positive and negative affect, meaning that 
participants in the schadenfreude condition was expected to feel more negative affect than 
participants in the happy condition. Positive affect was expected to be the same in both 
schadenfreude and happy conditions.  
 
Method 
 Participants. Participants were requited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and 118 
people completed the survey. Participants were paid 0.40 USD. However, 28 participants 
either guessed the purpose of the study or failed to answer the instructional manipulation 
check correctly (Oppenheimer et al., 2009), meaning that 90 participants were included in the 
analyses (48.9% women). The mean age of the participants was 34 years (SD = 12.43). 
Almost all participants were American. Most participants either had some college or were 
college graduates, and a small proportion had only completed high school (13.3%). 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2(affect prime: Schadenfreude vs Happy) between-
groups design.  
 Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to Kramer et 
al.’s (2011, Study 1) study. However, the study was not conducted in a laboratory, but was 
available on-line on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were asked to part-take in two 
ostensibly unrelated studies.  
 The first study used the same affective priming task as the in Study 3, but instead of 
using calmness as the control condition, happiness was used. Participants were thus asked to 
spend 5 minutes thinking about an event that affected them personally and made them feel 
happy when someone else who deserved it did really well at a particular task. The same 
instructions were given in the schadenfreude condition as in Study 3. Afterwards, participants 
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were asked to write about the event in as much detail and as vividly as possible. In order to 
determine if the manipulation was successful, participants were asked to indicate which 
emotions they felt in regards to the event just described by using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
not at all, 7 = extremely). The emotions were indicative of positive affect (happy, cheerful, 
delighted, joyful, pleased, good) and indicative of negative affect (sad, regretful, low, guilty, 
uneasy, bad), and were presented in random order. After completing the ratings, participants 
were thanked for participating in the first study. 
 Participants were then asked to participate in the second study, titled “consumer 
preferences”. Participants were asked to choose between three pairs of binoculars where two 
are categorised as an extreme option, and one is a compromise option. In the extreme option, 
participants had to make trade-offs between weight and magnification, where one binocular 
pair was light but had low magnification, and the other was heavy but had high 
magnification. The compromise option, on the other hand, was average in both attributes (the 
task can be found in Appendix G).  
 Lastly, demographic questions and practical questions regarding the distraction level 
of participants were asked. 
 
Results 
 The scores for the 6 positive emotions were averaged to form a positive affect index 
(α = .924) and the 6 negative emotions were averaged to form a negative affect index (α = 
.902).  
 Manipulation check. An independent samples t-test was conducted, which compared 
the average scores of the positive and negative affect indexes between the schadenfreude and 
happy conditions. Participants felt significantly more positive affect in the happy condition 
(M = 5.67) than in the schadenfreude condition (M = 4.70), t(88) = -3.820, p < .001, d = -
.807. The converse was found for negative affect where participants felt more negative affect 
in the schadenfreude condition (M = 2.42) than participants in the happy condition (M = 
1.58), t(68.18) = 3.389, p = .001, d = .716. The negative and positive affect indices were 
significantly correlated, r = -.498, p < .001, meaning that when there is a high score of 
positive affect, there is a low score of negative affect. 
 Choice of compromise option. To test whether the manipulation of schadenfreude or 
happiness affected the choice of compromise option over extreme options, a chi-squared test 
was conducted. A 2 x 3 chi-squared test was first conducted where the two extreme options 
were separated. However, this test did not meet the assumption that the expected cell count 
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must be over 5. The two extreme options were therefore combined, and a 2 x 2 chi-squared 
test was conducted. There was a significant association between the emotion felt and the 
choice of a compromise or extreme option, χ2 (1) = 4.593, p = .037, Φ = .226. Within the 
schadenfreude condition, 35.7% of the participants chose the conventional option, whereas in 
the happy condition, 58.3% of the participants chose the conventional option. This seems to 
represent the fact that based on the odds ratio, the odds for a participant to choose the 
conventional option is 2.8 times higher when s/he is happy.  
 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 4 shows that participants in the schadenfreude condition 
experienced less positive affect and more negative affect than participants in the happiness 
condition. In addition, participants in the schadenfreude condition chose one of the extreme 
options more often than participants in the happiness condition. These results did not 
replicate the findings from Kramer et al. (2011), where the opposite was found. Namely that 
participants in the schadenfreude condition chose the compromise option more often than 
participants in the happiness condition.  
This disparity between the present findings and Kramer et al.’s (2011) findings might 
be because participants in the present study did not feel schadenfreude. In order to feel 
schadenfreude one needs to appraise the misfortune of another as beneficial for oneself 
(Frjida, 1988), which implies that schadenfreude is experienced as a positive emotion. 
However, as participants in the schadenfreude condition experienced less positive affect and 
more negative affect than in the control condition, the affective priming task might have 
made participants not feel schadenfreude but rather sad or shameful. This is because the act 
of remembering such an immoral event as happiness of other’s misfortune (Baudelaire, 
1855/1955) can provide information about one’s moral character. Research has shown that 
the ease of bringing something to mind provides information about how people perceive 
events and themselves (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). A study asked participants to recall 12 
or six events of when they behaved in an assertive manner (Schwarz et al., 1991). The study 
found that participants who were told to recall 12 events rated themselves less assertive than 
participants in the six events condition. This is because the strain of bringing 12 assertive 
events to mind provides information that they are not assertive. However, the ease of 
recalling six events provides information that they in fact are assertive. Therefore, 
participants in the present study might have inferred that they are an immoral person because 
they were able to bring a schadenfreude-inducing event to mind, which then lead to them 
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feeling sad or shameful. Interestingly, previous research has shown that sad participants 
favour risky decisions due to goals of reward replacement (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
This corroborates with the results in the present study as participants in the schadenfreude 




 The aim of the present thesis was to investigate the effect of schadenfreude on 
decisions in four studies. The hypothesis was that feeling schadenfreude would increase the 
choice of conventional options in the ultimatum game (Study 1 and Study 2), in an economic 
version of the Asian disease problem (Study 3), and in consumer decisions involving 
compromise and extreme options. These predictions were supported by previous research, 
which found that schadenfreude made participants choose conventional consumer options, 
and conventional gambles (Kramer et al., 2011). This effect was found because 
schadenfreude provided information to participants about the possibility of a misfortune 
happening to them. The consequences of schadenfreude are important to study as 
schadenfreude often arises in contexts of competition (Leach & Spears, 2008). Thus, in 
competitive environments, such as organisations and universities, people are faced with many 
important decisions; making it essential to understand how schadenfreude affects decisions, 
as it is likely that schadenfreude of another person’s misfortune is often experienced in these 
environments.  
 However, Study 1 and 2 failed to find an effect of schadenfreude on decisions made 
in the ultimatum game. Event though previous studies have shown that emotions can affect 
allocations made in the ultimatum game (e.g., Ketelaar & Au, 2003), and that the 
manipulation checks in Study 1 and 2 showed that participants felt more schadenfreude in the 
experimental condition compared to the control condition. A possible explanation for this 
null-finding is that the use of the ultimatum game as a decision task is quite different from the 
decision tasks used in Kramer et al.’s (2011) studies: Decisions made in the ultimatum game 
affect other people (i.e., the responder), whereas gambles and consumer decisions only affect 
oneself. Therefore, the effect that schadenfreude informs decision-makers of the possibility of 
experiencing a misfortune might have been overridden by other concerns, such as 
anticipation of how the other player will respond to offers (Wells & Rand, 2012). 
Study 3 was then conducted using a decision task closer to that of Kramer et al. 
(2011, Study 3) where a gain framed gamble was used. Study 3 thus used an economic 
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version of the Asian disease problem, which included both gain and loss framed gambles in 
order to replicate Kramer et al.’s (2011) findings and to investigate the effect of 
schadenfreude on the choice of loss-framed gambles. An anticipation of unfavourable events 
scale was also included in order to investigate if the responses to this scale mediate the effect 
of schadenfreude on the choice of gambles. The results from Study 3 show that there was no 
difference in the choice of risky and safe options based on schadenfreude, which also 
provided non-significant mediation analyses. These results therefore failed to replicate 
Kramer et al.’s (2011) findings. Study 3 did however find an effect of framing where 
participants chose the safe option more often in the gain frame, compared to the loss frame, 
replicating Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) framing effect.   
In sum, the three first studies, which tested the same hypothesis as Kramer et al. 
(2011) but with different methods, did not find an effect of schadenfreude on decisions. 
Because of these unsuccessful conceptual replications, a direct replication of Kramer et al. 
(2011, Study 1) was conducted in Study 4, meaning that the same manipulations and 
measures were used.   
Participants were induced to either feel schadenfreude or happy and were asked to 
choose between compromise (conventional) or extreme (unconventional) options. The results 
from Study 4 showed that participants in the schadenfreude condition choose the 
unconventional option more often than participants in the control condition, which is the 
opposite of Kramer et al.’s (2011) findings. However, it is difficult to determine whether 
participants really felt schadenfreude, as the manipulation check showed that more negative 
affect and less positive affect was reported by participants in the schadenfreude condition. It 
might be that participants did not feel schadenfreude, but negative emotions, which 
subsequently affected participants to choose unconventionally. This corroborates with 
previous research where negative affect has shown to increase risky decisions (Raghunathan 
& Pham, 1999). Then again, the same affective priming task was used in Study 3, which 
showed to have made participants feel schadenfreude by using another scale. The 
informational value of schadenfreude might also not be as predicted, as shown in the non-
significant mediation analysis in Study 3, making it possible that schadenfreude affected 
participants’ unconventional decisions. Regardless of the interpretations, Study 4 showed that 
participant’s emotions affected their decisions, and the effect was opposite of the predicted 
direction, which is interesting as Studies 1 through 3 did not find an effect. The opposite 
direction of the results is perhaps not surprising as the hypotheses in the present thesis have 
been subject to a ceiling effect: The hypotheses predict that schadenfreude will make people 
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choose an option which is already chosen by the majority when not induced to feel any 
particular emotions, making it difficult to detect any differences between the experimental 
and control groups. However, Kramer et al. (2011) found that schadenfreude increases the 
choice likelihood of conventional options regardless of the ceiling effect. These conflicting 
results of finding opposite effects and non-significant effects show the importance of 
replicating studies, which is discussed next. 
 
Importance of Replication Studies 
 The practice of replicating research is often argued to be one of science’s defining 
features (Popper, 1934/1992). This is in order to strengthen theories by showing that the 
results replicate in different participant samples, or even by using other methods. Conversely, 
unsuccessful conceptual replications show the limits of theories. Replication studies are also 
important for the falsifiability of theories; by replicating studies and finding that there is no 
effect, perhaps due to a false positive in the original study (Smith, Mackie, & Claypool, 
2014).  
 However, over the past decades, a trend in psychological research has emerged where 
replicating studies has not been a priority for researchers. This is because researchers are met 
with strong incentives to bring forth new ideas, these incentives being publications, 
employment, and tenure (Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012). Replication studies, on the other 
hand, are not sought after. In addition, replication studies with null findings are not 
published. This is because researchers, aware that null findings rarely get published, do not 
submit their results for publication (Ferguson & Heene, 2012). The trend of not publishing 
null results has been coined the “file-drawer problem” (Rosenthal, 1979) and has prevented 
the falsifiability of theories (Ferguson & Heene, 2012). 
 The recent focus on replications has been amplified by the discovery in 2011 that 
Diederik Stapel, a highly respected social psychologist, had fabricated and falsified data 
through most of his research career, resulting in 53 publications being retracted (Stroebe, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2012). In his letter of justification, Stapel wrote that scientific fraud is too 
easy, as there are too few control mechanisms in science (Stroebe et al., 2012). Therefore, 
Tilburg University concluded in their report that psychological science should focus more on 
the replication of results (Stapel Investigation, 2012). The importance of replication studies is 
not only in order to catch unethical researchers, but also to find false positive results and to 
increase the reliability and validity of studies.   
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 The process of replicating studies and determining whether these are false positives or 
not are not straightforward tasks. There are many reasons for unsuccessful replications: First, 
the original effect may in fact be false. Second, the methodology of the replication differs 
from the original study in such a way that an effect is not found. Third, because of 
insufficient statistical power in the replication study (Open Science Collaboration, 2012). In 
addition, there are different views on what constitutes a successful replication. A narrow 
definition constitutes a successful replication when the same statistical significant effect as in 
the original study is obtained. According to a broad definition, a replication is successful 
when the effect is in the same direction as in the original study but is not necessarily 
significant (Open Science Collaboration, 2012).  
 Therefore, replication studies are important for the validity and reliability of studies, 
but it is not easy to determine whether an original study is a false positive through 
unsuccessful replication studies. For example, the present thesis’ results show that the direct 
replication of Kramer et al.’s (2011, Study 1) findings was unsuccessful where an opposite 
effect was found. However, a post-hoc statistical power analysis indicates that the statistical 
power of 0.5747 in Study 4 did not reach the recommended level of 0.8 (Cohen, 1988), 
making it difficult to conclude that Kramer et al.’s results are false positives. In addition, the 
unsuccessful conceptual replications of Kramer et al.’s (2011) findings might have been due 
to some methodological problems, which are discussed below. 
 
Limitations of the Present Studies 
  The first limitation is that the induction of schadenfreude might have not been 
successful to the extent that it affected behaviour. The video clips in Study 1 and 2 might 
have elicited emotion perception to the extent that participants appraised the emotional 
significance of the stimulus (Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003), which then produced 
significant differences in the manipulation checks. However, this manipulation might not 
have led to more elaborate processing such as the triggering of personally relevant memories 
and associations (Ellard, Farchione, & Barlow, 2012). This is shown where Ellard et al. 
(2012) found that films were not rated as personally relevant as music, meaning that films did 
not bring up past memories or that participants could personally relate to the emotions 
depicted in the film. Therefore, due to the dynamic nature of films, which is seen as an 
advantage (Schaefer et al., 2010), can also be a disadvantage: One is reacting to a situation 
that is presented in a film, which makes the personal relevance abstract. When watching 
films, the induction of emotional states is not generated from mental processing, but is only 
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presented to participants (Gerrard-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994). Music, on the other hand, 
can have direct associations to personal memories, and the music then generates an emotion 
because of these associations. For example, after the terror attacks in Oslo and Utøya on the 
22nd of July 2011, the song “Mitt lille land” became a song many found comfort in during 
their sorrow. When listening to this song, four years after the attacks, these emotions are 
brought up again.  
 Affective priming tasks, on the other hand, have the advantage that they generate 
more personally relevant emotions (Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003). As with music, 
emotions are internally generated, and not presented, in an affective priming task. However, 
the process of recalling emotional events leads to an overall intense elicitation of many 
emotions (Salas et al., 2012): When recalling an event, the target emotion, as well as other 
emotions, are elicited. As seen in Study 4, the process of eliciting schadenfreude through the 
affective priming task could have also elicited other emotions, such as sadness. This is 
problematic for studies that wish to investigate one emotion at a time. 
 The second limitation is the schadenfreude scale used in the manipulation checks in 
Study 1 through 3. These studies did not find differences in decisions between the 
schadenfreude and control conditions. One possible explanation for this is that the 
schadenfreude scale used in these studies might have led participants to discount the 
relevance of their feeling of schadenfreude when making decisions. For example, Keltner, 
Locke, and Audrain (1993) showed that perceived life satisfaction changed based on whether 
participants attributed their emotions to specific events or situational circumstances. After 
reading a story that made participants feel sad, they were either asked to write about their 
current emotions and the causes of these, or to write about their emotions in regards to being 
in the laboratory. Participants who were asked to label their emotions after the sad story knew 
that they were feeling sad because of the story, which then made them discount the 
informational value of their sadness when evaluating their life satisfaction. In the present 
studies, one of the items in the schadenfreude scale is “I feel schadenfreude” (Van Dijk et al., 
2005), which then could have lead to participants disregarding the informational value of this 
emotion when making decisions. An important premise in feelings-as-information theory is 
that the source of incidental emotions is not disclosed when people are making decisions 
based on what they are feeling (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  
 However, Keltner et al.’s (1993) study used an evaluative judgement task, while the 
present studies used a decision task. The nature of an evaluative judgement task is 
predominantly emotional, making the negative emotions a central source of information. 
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Decision tasks, on the other hand, are not predominantly emotional which means that there is 
no direct link between the emotion felt and the task at hand. Therefore, in Keltner et al.’s 
(1993) study participants were aware that their current sad emotions were due to the sad story 
and not necessarily due to poor life satisfaction. However, in the present study, the 
manipulation check did not ask about the direct link of how schadenfreude can affect 
decisions. In other words, the manipulation check did not ask participants whether they were 
afraid that a misfortune is going to happen to them because they saw someone experiencing a 
misfortune. However, as Study 1 through 3 did not find an effect on emotion in the decision 
tasks, but Study 4 did, which used another emotion scale, it is possible that labelling of 
emotion terms also affect subsequent decision tasks, and not only evaluative judgements.  
 The final limitation is whether the design of the studies made sure that participants’ 
affect was used in the decision tasks. According to dual processing theories (e.g., Kahneman, 
2011) people processes information in two different ways: through a fast, affective system 1 
or through a slow, analytical system 2. System 1 is often used when people are under high 
cognitive load, which then implies that mental short cuts or heuristics are used. The use of 
emotions in decision tasks is a kind of heuristic where one asks, “how do I feel about it?” 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Therefore, under cognitive load the use of emotions in decision 
tasks would be more prevalent. The present studies did not manipulate cognitive load, 
perhaps making it possible for participants to use the more analytical system 2.  
 In sum, the present thesis’ studies had some methodological problems. However, as 
this research area is relatively new (i.e., to our knowledge only one previous study has 
investigated the effect of schadenfreude on decisions), there is no consensus on which 
methods that should be used. For example, researchers seem to disagree on which method to 
elicit emotions is the most effective where Schaefer et al. (2010) argue the use of films is the 
most effective, whereas Salas et al. (2012) argue affective priming tasks are most effective. In 
addition, as schadenfreude research has mainly focused on the antecedent triggers of this 
emotion, there is no consensus on how to properly induce schadenfreude and then how to 
measure feelings of schadenfreude in manipulation checks. Keltner et al.’s (1993) research 
suggests the use of specific emotion terms in manipulation checks can cause participants to 
disregard the informational value of their emotions. Future research must therefore be 
conducted to address these problems, which is discussed next. 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
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Schadenfreude is a common emotion felt by most people at various times. It is easy to 
imagine that schadenfreude can affect people’s behaviour, and it is therefore important to 
investigate the effect of schadenfreude on behaviour and decisions. Despite Study 1 through 
3 not finding an effect, future studies should focus on developing methods to induce and 
measure schadenfreude in order to conclude with certainty whether schadenfreude affects 
decisions or not.   
The induction of schadenfreude is difficult as schadenfreude is a complex emotion 
where many factors must be present in order for one to feel schadenfreude; such as whether 
the person experiencing the misfortune deserved it (Feather, 1999), if this person is resented 
because of his higher position (Feather, 2008), if he is disliked (Hareli & Weiner, 2002), and 
if he is envied (Smith et al., 1996). Video clips are disadvantaged when it comes to eliciting 
schadenfreude due to feelings of resentment, and envy, because these factors vary between 
people. Affective priming tasks, on the other hand, do not face the same problems. However, 
the process of remembering events that elicit schadenfreude might induce other emotions, 
such as guilt and sadness. It would be interesting for future research to further pre-test 
schadenfreude videos, and look at whether there are some demographic or personal 
differences in the schadenfreude felt between these videos. For example, students might feel 
more schadenfreude when another resented student suffers a misfortune compared to the rest 
of the population. Different schadenfreude videos can then be presented according to some 
demographic variables.  
Second, future studies should investigate which schadenfreude scale is the most 
effective as a manipulation check. As discussed above, the use of the emotion term 
schadenfreude in manipulation checks can lead to the discounting of the informational value 
of the emotion in subsequent decision tasks (Keltner et al., 1993). It would be beneficial to 
directly test whether the use of the term schadenfreude in manipulation checks does discount 
the informational value of this emotion. Future research could use the same manipulation and 
the same decision task but then change the scale used in the manipulation check. For 
example, future research could compare Van Dijk et al.’s (2005) schadenfreude scale (which 
the present thesis used in Study 1 through 3) with Hareli and Weiner’s (2002) scale, which 
operationalized schadenfreude by measuring joy, pleasure, and happiness.  
Lastly, it would be interesting for future studies to manipulate cognitive load and see 
whether emotions are used as information. This can be done by introducing an additional 
memory task (e.g., Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998). As Study 1 through 3 did not find an effect 
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of emotions on the decision task, maybe emotions are only used as information when 
heuristic processing is the only option (Forgas, 2008).  
 
Ethical Considerations 
 As the present studies used various degrees of deception a discussion of the ethical 
considerations is in order. First, it is important to mention that these studies were approved by 
the Department of Psychology’s Research Ethics Committee at the University of Oslo 
(reference number: 875929).  
In Study 1 through 4, participants were not informed about the real purpose of the 
study, making them unable to give informed consent. Participants were lead to believe that 
they were participating in two separate studies when these were actually one study. In 
addition, the ostensible purpose given to the participants was not true. However, according to 
APA’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American Psychological 
Association, 2002) deception is justified if non-deceptive alternatives are not feasible. In 
order for participants to attribute informational value to their emotions when making a 
decision, they have to believe that the decision task is eliciting the emotion (Schwarz & 
Clore, 2007). Therefore, if participants are unaware of the source which their emotions arise 
from, they will think that the emotion is integral to the decision task. If participants were 
informed about the purpose, i.e., the study of how schadenfreude affects decisions, then they 
would have discounted the informational value of their emotions when making a decision. 
Therefore, the present studies use of deception is justifiable in terms of alternative 
nondeceptive methods are not available.  
 In Study 1, additional deception was used. In order to ensure that participants believed 
they were playing the ultimatum game, a confederate was used. In addition, participants were 
led to believe that they would be paid according to the outcome of the ultimatum game. 
However, as the other participant in the lab was a non-participating confederate, and all 
allocations were rejected, participants did not receive any money. The study was designed in 
such a way mainly because we did not have the funds to pay participants according to the 
outcome of a 100 NOK ultimatum game. It is important to note that participants were first 
informed about the possibility of financial incentives after they had agreed to participate in 
the study. The possibility of winning money was therefore not used to attract people into 
participating in the study. However, it can be argued that the design of Study 1 was 
unnecessarily deceiving, as it looks like a design with the absence of a confederate and a 
much smaller financial incentive (i.e., Study 2) produced the same results. This is 
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problematic because this can lead to contamination of the participant pool (Hertwig & 
Ortmann, 2001). By contamination it is meant that participants no longer trust experiments in 
judgement and decision making, which then can alter their behaviour in these experiments. 
However, from an ethical point of view, studies have shown that participants do not feel hurt 
after they have been deceived. Conversely, participants seem to enjoy experiments that use 
deception more than non-deception experiments (Christensen, 1988). When participants in 
Study 1 were debriefed, they also expressed that they were not offended in any way by the 
deception; many thought the design was very clever and they were glad to have been a part of 
it. In addition, great importance was put on debriefing the participants properly and a 
thorough debriefing form was given (see Appendix H for the debriefing form in Norwegian). 
 
Conclusion 
 Schadenfreude is the experience of satisfaction when other people fail. Previous 
research has shown that when one feels schadenfreude, this serves as information for the 
schadenfroh person that he or she can also experience a misfortune. Therefore, when feeling 
this emotion, people tend to choose more secure, conventional options (Kramer et al., 2011). 
The present study therefore wished to further explore the effects of schadenfreude on 
decisions and looked at how this emotion affects decisions made in the ultimatum game and 
decisions involving risk. However, when these studies did not find any differences in 
decisions, a direct replication of Kramer et al.’s (2011, Study 1) study was conducted. This 
study found that participants in the schadenfreude condition chose the extreme option more 
often compared to the control condition, which was the opposite of Kramer et al.’s (2011) 
results. As it is difficult to conclude whether participants felt schadenfreude in this study, 
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Appendix A – Links to videos used in the pre-test 
 
Video Link Length 
Video 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NqbKN8VgdME 2:59 min 
Video 2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Pp493qUB9A 3:10 min 
Video 3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42pQDt0BOUU 0:19 min 
Video 4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=POt4I6UxwzM 0:47 min 
Video 5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkCsZZtBEhw 0:25 min 
Video 6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-vZmO0TxtA 0:15 min 
Video 7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PbGPKhb8ZBI 0:26 min 
Video 8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lj3iNxZ8Dww 0:48 min 
 
 




I enjoy what happened to… Jeg gledet meg over det som skjedde 
med… 
I’m satisfied with what happened to… Jeg er tilfreds med det som hendte… 
I couldn’t resist a little smile Jeg kunne ikke la vær å smile litt 
I actually had to laugh a bit Jeg måtte faktisk le litt 




I commiserate with … about what 
happened 
Jeg har medfølelse for det som skjedde 
med… 
I feel sorry for what happened to… Jeg synes det som skjedde med … var 
synd 
I sympathize with… Jeg føler sympati med… 
 
 
Appendix C – Links to videos used in Study 1 and Study 2 
 
Video Link Length 
Schadenfreude https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=POt4I6UxwzM 0:47 min 






Appendix D – Instructions given in the ultimatum game in Study 1 (Norwegian) and 




You have been randomly assigned the 
role of Player 1. Your task is to divide 1 
dollar between you and the other 
participant you have been paired with. 
The other participant has been assigned 
the role of Player 2 where his/her task is 
to decide whether to accept or reject the 
division made by you.  
 
If Player number 2 accepts your division 
then the both of you will receive the 
amount of money according to your 
division. However, if Player 2 rejects 
your division both of you will receive no 
money. 
 
This is a one-shot game. This means that 
 you divide the money once, and then the  
game is over. 
 
 
Du har blitt tilfeldig valgt til å 
være spiller nummer 1. Din oppgave er 
å fordele 100 kr mellom deg og spiller 
nummer 2. Dersom spiller nummer 2 
godtar fordelingen din, så får hver spiller 
summen som er foreslått. Hvis spiller 
nummer 2 avslår fordelingen så får ingen 
av spillerne noe.  
 
Du får bare spille en runde. Dette betyr 
at du får fordele pengene bare en gang, så 


























































Gain frame  
English Norwegian 
Imagine you have invested 600 000 NOK 
in a company that is now threatened by 
bankruptcy. You consult a broker and he 
says that you have two possible strategies 
for handling the situation, Strategy A and 
Strategy B. 
 
The broker describes the strategies in this 
way: 
• With Strategy A, 200 000 
NOK will be saved for 
sure. 
• With Strategy B, there is a 
1/3 probability of saving 
the whole sum of 600 000 
NOK, and a 2/3 
probability that nothing 
will be saved. 
 
Which strategy will you choose?   
 
Tenk deg at du har investert 600 000 kr i 
en bedrift som er på randen av konkurs. 
Du rådfører deg med en aksjemegler og 
han sier at du har to strategier å velge 
mellom, Strategi A og Strategi B.  
  
 
Aksjemegleren beskriver strategiene slik: 
  
• Med Strategi A vil 200 000 kr bli 
reddet helt sikkert. 
• Med Strategi B er det 1/3 sjanse 
for at hele summen på 600 000 kr 
vil bli reddet, og 2/3 sjanse for at 
ingenting vil bli reddet. 
 
Hvilken strategi vil du velge? 
 
Loss frame  
English Norwegian 
Imagine you have invested 600 000 NOK 
in a company that is now threatened by 
bankruptcy. You consult a broker and he 
says that you have two possible strategies 
for handling the situation, Strategy A and 
Strategy B.  
 
The broker describes the strategies in this 
way: 
• With Strategy A, 400 000 NOK 
will be lost for sure. 
• With Strategy B, 1/3 probability 
that nothing of the 600 000 NOK 
will be lost, and a 2/3 probability 
that the whole sum will be lost. 
 
Which strategy will you choose? 
Tenk deg at du har investert 600 000 kr i 
en bedrift som er på randen av konkurs. 
Du rådfører deg med en aksjemegler og 
han sier at du har to strategier å velge 
mellom, Strategi A og Strategi B.  
  
 
Aksjemegleren beskriver strategiene slik: 
  
• Med Strategi A vil 400 000 kr bli 
tapt helt sikkert. 
• Med Strategi B er det 1/3 sjanse 
for at ingenting av de 600 000 kr 
vil bli tapt, og 2/3 sjanse for at alt 
vil bli tapt. 
 




Appendix F – Norwegian translation of the anticipation of unfavourable outcomes scale 




If something goes wrong for me, it will Hvis noe kan gå galt for meg, så vil det 
skje. 
Things never work out the way I want 
them to 
Ingenting går som jeg vil at det skal gå. 
I rarely count on good things happening 
to me 
Jeg tror sjelden på at bra ting kommer til 




Appendix G – Consumer task used in Study 4 
 
  
Imagine that you are in need of a pair of binoculars. 
  
You have three different binoculars to choose from, which are: 
  
• Binocular pair 1 has the highest magnification power and is the heaviest. 
  
• Binocular pair 2 has the lowest magnification power and is the lightest. 
  
• Binocular pair 3 has average magnification power and is average in weight. 
  




















Referanse nummer fra Department of Psychology’s Research Ethics Committee: 
875929 
 
Du har nå deltatt i en studie om effekten av emosjoner på individers beslutninger. Det 
er to betingelser i denne studien; en kontroll og en eksperimentell. I 
kontrollbetingelsen vises nøytrale videoer, og i den eksperimentelle betingelsen vises 
morsomme videoer som skal indusere skadefryd. Vi ga inntrykk av at dette var to 
separate eksperimenter (vurdere videoer og ultimatumspillet), men dette var egentlig 
et eksperiment. Studien er lagt opp slik for å sikre at deltagerne ikke skal være 
oppmerksomme på kilden til sine følelser under ultimatumspillet. 
 
Skadefryd er glede eller nytelse over andres motgang eller ulykke. Det er en helt 
naturlig og menneskelig følelse som de fleste opplever jevnlig. Tidligere studier har 
vist at skadefryd kan påvirke hvilke beslutninger man tar (Kramer, Yucel-Aybat & 
Lau-Gesk, 2011), ved at deltagere velger sikre alternativer når de føler skadefryd. De 
argumenterer for at den underliggende årsaken til dette er at deltagerne er redd for å 
bli utsatt for andres skadefryd.  
 
Av den grunn ønsker vi i denne studien å undersøke om skadefryd fører til en mer 
generøs fordeling av penger i ultimatumspillet. Ettersom vi kun er interessert i 
hvordan spiller 1 fordeler pengene, har du ikke blitt tilfeldig valgt ut som spiller 1. 
Spiller 2 er ikke en deltager, men slik eksperimentet er programmert. Vi hadde en 
medsammensvoren som satt på en annen pc, men denne personen gjorde noe helt 
annet. Dette ble gjort fordi tidligere studier har vist at både det å se hvem man spiller 
mot og økonomiske insentiver får deltagere til å anstrenge seg mer i spillet (Hertwig 
& Ortmann, 2001). 
 
Det er viktig for oss å understreke at det ikke var et menneske som var spiller 2. 
Programmet ville avslått ditt tilbud uansett hva det var, på grunn av manglende 
forskningsstøtte. Det var altså ingen som «hevnet» seg på deg fordi de syntes du gav 
dem et dårlig tilbud, og ingen som gledet seg over å avslå tilbudet du ga. Det er heller 
ingen som vet hvilket tilbud du kom med. Vi forstår frustrasjonen av dette 
bedrageriet, men vi håper at du forstår hvorfor vi måtte gjøre det. Som takk ønsker vi 
å tilby deg en liten sjokolade. 
 
Vi setter stor pris på om du ikke forteller andre potensielle deltagere om formålet med 
denne studien. 
 
Dersom du har noen spørsmål eller kommentarer til studien er du hjertelig 
velkommen til å ta kontakt med Anine Riege (a.c.riege@psykologi.uio.no) eller 
Johanna Blomster (johannbl@student.sv.uio.no).  
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